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Simpson: The Monster in the Closet: Declawing the Inequitable Conduct Beas

THE MONSTER IN THE CLOSET: DECLAWING
THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT BEAST IN THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ARENA
INTRODUCTION
The monster rearing its ugly head in the nightmares of patent
practitioners1 goes by the name of “inequitable conduct”—and it has
been sinking its claws into practitioners all too frequently in recent
decades.2 Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee, his attorney, or
anyone associated with the prosecution of the patent, breaches his
duty of candor and good faith by affirmatively misrepresenting or
failing to disclose material information to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO).3 “A charge of inequitable conduct
typically arises as a defense to patent infringement. A defendant will
allege that a plaintiff’s patent is unenforceable because of
improprieties carried out during the patent’s prosecution.”4
A finding of inequitable conduct has potentially devastating and
far-reaching consequences for the patentee and the prosecuting patent
1. “Patent practitioners” include patent attorneys and patent agents (technically qualified nonlawyers) who draft and prosecute patent applications before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO),
have passed the patent bar examination, and have obtained licenses from the PTO. See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 11.6, 11.7, 11.9, 11.10 (2007). This term has generated some controversy, and some question whether
the attorney-client privilege should extend to patent agents. See generally Arnold D. Litt et al.,
Comment, The Patent Practitioner Attains Majority: An Examination of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work Product Rule As They Pertain to the Patent Attorney and Agent, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 531
(1972–1973). That inquiry is outside of the scope of this Note.
2. See, e.g., Thomas L. Irving et al., The Inequitable Conduct “Plague” in U.S. Patent Litigation,
IP LAW & TECH. PROGRAMME (2006) available at http://www.finnegan.com/files/PDFs/
200902041002333521848news1385.pdf (noting that “[f]or almost the last [twenty] years, ‘the habit of
charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has [been] an absolute plague’”)
(internal citations omitted); Andrea Kamage and Deborah Sterling, The Patent Plague: Inequitable
Conduct Findings Are on the Rise, with No End in Sight, IP L. & BUS. Aug. 2005 at 28 (noting that
“[t]here’s no end in sight for the profusion of inequitable conduct charges” and even though “the
inequitable conduct plague might be less creepy than a pack of locusts, it’s no less bothersome to those
affected.”).
3. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007); see also GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“prov[ing] inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent requires evidence of affirmative
misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
material information, coupled with an intent to deceive”) (citation omitted).
4. Kamage, supra note 2; see also Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2007).

735

Published by Reading Room, 2009

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1

736

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

attorney.5 Because an inequitable conduct charge involves the patent
attorney's intent, the patentee may wish to call the attorney who
prosecuted the patent to testify at trial.6 Unfortunately, when the
patent attorney testifies about his intent (or lack thereof) to deceive
the PTO during the prosecution of the patent at issue, that testimony
may waive attorney-client privilege.7
Attorney-client privilege waiver in the context of inequitable
conduct remains chaotic. Many district courts fumble with which law
to apply;8 even when the courts choose the right law for attorneyclient privilege in inequitable conduct cases, they inconsistently
construe the scope of the waiver, compromising fairness and
predictability.9 That uncertainty defeats the privilege’s purpose; as
Justice Rehnquist stated, “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”10
Further complicating matters, patent law has entered a major state
of flux. The United States House of Representatives ratified a major
patent reform bill in 2007,11 two patent reform bills were under
consideration in the United States Senate in 2008,12 the Supreme

5. See discussion infra Part I.A.
6. See, e.g., GFI, 265 F.3d at 1273; Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL
781252, *2, 6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2007); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1673, 1679–80 (D. Del. 1990).
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.b.
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.
10. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (striking down a district court’s test—
basing availability of attorney-client privilege upon whether a corporation’s officer played a
“‘substantial role’ in deciding and directing the corporation’s legal response”—because it was difficult
to apply and caused “disparate decisions,” revealing its unpredictability).
11. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Christopher Faille, Patent Reform
Clears Hurdle, HEDGE WORLD DAILY NEWS, 2007 WLNR 17684327 (Sept. 10, 2007). “The U.S. House
of Representatives on Friday [Sept. 7] approved a sweeping patent law reform bill, in response to the
concerns raised by industry groups that intellectual property claims and resulting litigation have become
a bottleneck for innovation and growth. The vote was 220–175.” Id.
12. GovTrack.us, S. 1145; Patent Reform Act of 2007, available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (noting that S. 1145 was introduced in 2007 by Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt) and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar in January of 2008 for consideration by the
Senate); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposed by Senate Minority Whip
Jon Kyl (R-Az) in September of 2008, and specifically offering ideas for reform in the arena of
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Court has granted certiorari and reversed an unusually high number
of patent cases appealed from the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit,13 and the PTO is proposing to revamp its rules to
significantly shift the burden from its examiners back onto patentees
and their attorneys.14 The first set of new PTO rules, promulgated in
August of 2007 and originally slated to become effective November
1, 2007, met with a last-minute preliminary injunction and were
found to exceed the scope of the PTO’s rulemaking authority.15
Another new set of PTO rules, directly related to the duty of
disclosure,16 were proposed by the PTO in 2006 and will become
effective if approved.17 Now, with patent law in flux, and the new
duty of disclosure rules hovering on the horizon, the perfect storm
exists for litigation in inequitable conduct cases to run amuck.
This Note will address three main topics. Part I will provide a
general primer on the patent law rules for inequitable conduct cases,
including when attorney-client privilege is implicated, when it is
waived, and how courts determine the relevant choice of law in those
cases.18 Part II will analyze the inconsistency in the federal courts’
inequitable conduct) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
110_cong_bills&docid=f:s3600is.txt.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), rev’g 453 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007), rev’g 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2005); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), rev’g 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), rev’g 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
14. See Robert Hulse, New Rules for U.S. Patent Applications, MONDAQ, 2007 WLNR 16534630
(Aug. 24, 2007).
15. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656–57 (E.D. Va. 2007) (issuing a preliminary injunction,
halting the implementation of the PTO’s promulgated rules); Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 806
(E.D. Va. 2008) (finding the “rules promulgated by PTO were substantive rules, and thus exceeded
scope of the PTO’s rulemaking authority”).
16. Dorothy R. Auth, Patent Application Disclosure Requirements and Inequitable Conduct for
Failure to Disclose, 26 IPL NEWSLETTER 1, 1 (No. 3, Spring 2008); John Gladstone Mills et al.,
Information Disclosure (Prior Art) Statements and Proposed Rules Modifying Information Disclosure
Statement (IDS) Practice Before the USPTO, PAT. L. BASICS § 13:19, pt. IV (Oct. 2007); see also 71
Fed. Reg. 38808 (July 10, 2006).
17. Some consider those rules drastic enough to warrant fleeing patent work altogether. See, e.g.,
Steven M. Nipper, New USPTO IDS Regulations a Litigator’s Dream???????, http://inventblog.com/
2007/08/new-uspto-ids-regulations-a-litigators-dream.html (Aug. 9, 2007) (lamenting that because
“[t]he patent system is under massive attack from all three branches of government: judicial (KSR),
legislative (the bogus ‘patent reform’ bill) and executive (this IDS rule and the continuation rule, out of
the PTO)[,] [i]t’s time to start getting out of the patent prosecution business”) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
18. See discussion infra Part I.
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application of whether attorney-client privilege is implicated when an
attorney testifies against a charge of inequitable conduct, highlighting
how courts across the United States apply the scope of that waiver
unevenly; Part II will also address whether classifying an attorney as
a fact witness under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—governing
testimony of
designated
corporate
representatives—allows testimony in defense of inequitable conduct
charges without implicating attorney-client privilege.19 Part III will
propose possible solutions for the inequities caused by the
inconsistent application of the scope of the attorney-client privilege
waiver, from legislative solutions modifying the new information
disclosure statement rules, to judicial solutions creating more
consistent, predictable interpretations of the attorney-client privilege
waiver, to litigation strategies aimed at helping attorneys and clients
cope with the uncertainties in the meantime.20
I. BACKGROUND
A. Inequitable Conduct21
“A patent may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct
if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the [patent]
examiner, fails to disclose material information or submits materially
false information to the PTO during prosecution.”22 This duty extends
to “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application,” including the attorneys writing and prosecuting
the patent before the PTO.23 All individuals associated with the

19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. Inequitable conduct is considered a type of “fraud upon the PTO,” a somewhat antiquated term
in this context. See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
22. Id. at 1345 (citations omitted).
23. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a), (c) (2007). Inequitable conduct does not apply to attorneys litigating the
patent in court, but only to attorneys or agents writing the patent applications and communicating with
the PTO (referred to as “patent prosecution” rather than “patent litigation”). Generally, the attorney
prosecuting the patent differs from the attorney litigating the patent in court.
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patent’s filing must disclose, inter alia, all known prior art24 and
other information likely to affect the PTO’s decision to grant the
patent.25
Currently, one primary method for disclosing information to the
PTO includes filing a document called an Information Disclosure
Statement (IDS).26 Under the current rules, practitioners prepare an
IDS by, inter alia, listing out all patents or other documents that they
know may be material to the pending prosecution and, subject to
limitations required by law, send it to the PTO—along with copies of
the documents—to satisfy the duty of disclosure.27 A failure to satisfy
this duty adequately constitutes inequitable conduct.28 An IDS may
list hundreds of references, many of which could be in foreign
languages that may or may not be fully translated.29 Under the new
disclosure rules proposed by the PTO, the list in the IDS would be
limited to twenty items; any items submitted in excess of twenty
would require an accompanying explanation of the relevance of the
item to the new invention.30 This new twist could make it even more
important to iron out the kinks in the attorney-client privilege waiver
issue for inequitable conduct cases.31
A successful claim of inequitable conduct also requires proof of
intent to deceive.32 Intent cannot be presumed, and cannot be
established where “the applicant did not know of the undisclosed
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 106 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “prior art” as information “publicly
known, used by others, or available on the date of invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art,
including what would be obvious from that knowledge”). “The U.S. [PTO] and courts analyze prior art
before deciding the patentability of a comparable invention.” Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 Supp.
II 2002).
25. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007) (governing the duty of disclosure).
26. Id. §§ 1.56, 1.97, and 1.98 (2007).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1.56.
29. See generally Dennis Crouch, Prepare for the New IDS Rules (Oct. 20, 2007),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/10/prepare-for-the.html (“In some cases, extensive pre-filing
prior art searches reveal dozens (if not hundreds) of prior art references that are all then submitted to the
PTO for review.”) (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
30. Auth, supra note 16; Stephen Schreiner, Patent Office Treatment of Financial Matters, 123
B.L.J. 660 (2006).
31. See Nipper, supra note 17.
32. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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information . . . , did not know of the materiality of the omission or
misstatement, or the applicant’s omission or error ‘did not result from
an intent to mislead the PTO.’”33 More recently, the intent to deceive
inquiry has seemingly relaxed, and some courts now find inequitable
conduct in cases where the attorney simply lacked a good-faith
reason for failure to disclose, effectively shifting the burden of proof
to practitioners.34
A finding of inequitable conduct has potentially devastating and
far reaching consequences for a patentee, including (1) rendering the
entire patent unenforceable,35 (2) forcing the patentee to pay the
opponent’s attorney’s fees in an infringement suit,36 and (3) leading
to liability under the antitrust laws, Federal Trade Commission Act,
or securities laws.37 It may also stigmatize the attorney—regardless
of whether the claim of inequitable conduct succeeds—and may
“lead to disciplinary proceedings against the attorney at the PTO and
before his or her state bar.”38
In one case, a district court found the defendant’s former attorney
had committed inequitable conduct as part of its analysis invalidating

33. Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine: Lessons from Recent Cases, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 719, 722 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1345
(stating that courts, inferring intent to deceive from circumstances and facts surrounding an applicant’s
overall conduct, do not require “smoking gun evidence”) (citations and quotations omitted).
34. Compare Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Kamage,
supra note 2 with M. Eagles Tools Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2006) and Irving, supra note 2, at 1 (noting a series of Federal Circuit cases from February
and March of 2006 that “appear to offer a path towards ‘healthy’ living; a path leading away from an
absolute liability standard . . . and at long last toward reasonability, more properly taking into account
the complexities of patent preparation and prosecution”). See also Cameron K. Weiffenbach,
Implications of Praxair v. ATMI, IP.Law360.com, http://ip.law360.com/print_article/79672 (Jan. 14,
2009) (highlighting the inconsistent and fluctuating application of inequitable conduct standards by the
Federal Circuit in the latter part of 2008).
35. Unenforceability is a defense to liability for patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000 & Supp.
II 2002); see also Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1338; Mech. Plastic Corp. v. Rawlplug Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1058, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[T]o set up a disincentive for shirking this duty to disclose, courts
have permitted defendants to assert, as a defense to a claim of patent infringement, that the patent in suit
is unenforceable by reason of the applicant’s ‘inequitable conduct’ in dealings with the PTO.’’).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (allowing for an award of attorney’s fees in exceptional cases).
37. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (2007); see also Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at
1346.
38. Jerry Cohen, Ethical Issues in Intellectual Property, in INTELL. PROP. PRAC. § 12-3 (2004).
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the defendant’s patent.39 Although the court mentioned the attorney
by name—potentially impacting his reputation and his liability—the
Federal Circuit found the denial of the attorney’s motion to intervene
proper because he “lack[ed] a substantial legal interest in the
underlying litigation.”40 The Federal Circuit, though affirming the
refusal to allow the attorney to intervene, addressed the merits of the
case, saying that “there appears to be some force to [the attorney’s]
argument on the merits.”41 It is upon this backdrop of inequitable
conduct, with high stakes for patentees and attorneys, where the
attorney-client privilege waiver analysis begins.
B. A General Overview of Attorney-Client Privilege and Its Waiver
in the Patent Context
When a prosecuting patent attorney testifies in defense of a charge
of inequitable conduct, the court must determine (1) the appropriate
choice of law for analyzing attorney-client privilege; (2) whether
attorney-client privilege is implicated; (3) if attorney-client privilege
is implicated, whether a waiver has occurred; and (4) if a waiver has
occurred, what is the scope of that waiver.42 Before exploring the
relevant cases in depth,43 some background on the applicable choice
of law and the rules of attorney-client privilege is in order. 44
1. Choice of Law
When analyzing attorney-client privilege and its waiver in
inequitable conduct cases, courts must determine whether to apply
the law of the regional circuit or the law of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, which governs substantive issues of patent law.45
39. Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (E.D. Tenn. 2006), aff’d in part by
497 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
40. Nisus, 497 F.3d at 1322.
41. Id.
42. See generally In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
43. See discussion infra Part II.
44. See discussion infra Part I.B.1–2.
45. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803.
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The Federal Circuit will apply regional circuit law to procedural
issues that are not themselves substantive patent law issues so long as
they do not (1) “intimately involve[] . . . enforcement of [a] patent
right, . . . (2) bear an essential relationship to matters committed to
[its] exclusive control by statute, or (3) clearly implicate the
jurisprudential responsibilities of th[e] court in a field within its
exclusive jurisdiction.”46
In In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that determining whether privilege attaches to a communication in a
case of inequitable conduct is governed by the law of the Federal
Circuit because it touches on substantive issues of patent law.47
However, once a court has determined that the attorney-client
privilege is implicated, the question of whether or not the patentee
waived that privilege is a matter of regional circuit law because the
issue of privilege waiver is merely procedural.48 District courts had
some trouble determining which law to apply after Spalding. Even
after the Federal Circuit attempted to further clarify the choice of law
dilemma in Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co. by specifically holding
that the Federal Circuit “applies the law of the regional circuit . . .
with respect to questions of attorney-client privilege and waiver of
attorney-client privilege”; in inequitable conduct cases,49 district
courts still routinely misapply the law.50
46. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also
Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803.
47. Spalding, 203 F.3d at 803–04. After a lower court found attorney-client privilege waiver and
ordered production of an invention record, patentee sought relief with the Federal Circuit. Id. The
Federal Circuit held the invention record subject to attorney-client privilege, which was neither waived
nor pierced by the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege waiver. Id. In this case, the court
articulated the appropriate standard for choice of law. Id. See also Matthew R. Rodgers, Comment,
Patent Law: Attorney-Client Privilege in Patent Litigation: Did the Federal Circuit Go Far Enough with
In re Spalding Sports Worldwide?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 731, 740–43 (2002).
48. See, e.g., GFI, 265 F.3d at 1272 (holding that regional circuit law governs waiver by disclosure
of privileged material); In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that regional circuit law governs privilege); In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that regional circuit law governs privilege); Dorf & Stanton Commc’n, Inc. v.
Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919, 922–23 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that regional circuit law governs
discovery orders and waiver).
49. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1344–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
50. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
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2. Attorney-Client Privilege in the Patent Context
Attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege under common law
regarding confidential communications.51 “Deeply rooted in public
policy, and playing a ‘vital role’ in the administration of justice, it
remains one of the most carefully guarded privileges and is not
readily to be whittled down.”52 Litigants may potentially abuse the
waiver of attorney-client privilege in inequitable conduct cases, using
it as a ‘tactic’ to garner privileged information from their
opponents.53
Inequitable conduct charges appear in almost every case because
inequitable conduct is the magic bullet, capable of destroying an
entire patent in one fell swoop.54 Moreover, it creates negative
equities, permitting the accused infringer to paint the patentee black.
The natural consequence forces the patentee to decide how to defend
the case; the patentee can pull his punches and preserve the privilege
or waive privilege and pray the scope of the waiver is reasonable.
Thus, the scope of attorney-client privilege waiver, and the scope of
the compelled disclosure, raise substantial issues of fairness to the
parties.55
a. Determining When Attorney-Client Privilege Is Implicated
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that the law of privileges
“shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience.”56 Attorney-client privilege generally protects
communications between attorneys and clients from compelled
disclosure. It applies to any communication satisfying the following
51. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
52. Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8,
2007) (internal citations omitted).
53. See Rodgers, supra note 47, at 749 n.148 and accompanying text.
54. See discussion supra Part I.A.
55. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.
56. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also FED. R. EVID. 502 (enacted in late 2008 and limiting waiver of
attorney-client privilege for inadvertent disclosures and disclosures made in state proceedings, while
giving teeth to court orders and party agreements governing the scope of the waiver).
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elements: it must be “(1) a communication (2) made between
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining
or providing legal assistance for the client.”57
b. Determining Whether the Attorney-Client Privilege Is
Waived in Inequitable Conduct Cases
“The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may
waive it.”58 When a prosecuting patent attorney testifies in defense of
an inequitable conduct charge, a waiver may occur if the attorney
discloses any privileged communications between the attorney and
client.59 In reality, courts often find waiver whether or not the
testifying attorney specifically mentions any communications with
the client; it seems sufficient for the attorney to put his state of mind
at issue, thereby waiving privilege for any documents tending to
support or refute his testimony.60 Thus, the waiver is implied by
conduct.61 Once an attorney begins making statements that could only
be refuted by documentation subject to attorney-client privilege,
courts often require disclosure of those documents tending to support
or refute the attorney’s statements. If, however, the attorney can
testify as to his state of mind while pointing to non-privileged
communications to substantiate his testimony, waiver may not
occur.62 “‘Waiver’ in this broad sense follows from any conduct by
the client that would make it unfair for him thereafter to assert the
privilege.”63
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
58. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
59. See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (D. Del. 1990); Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel
Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2007).
60. Gen. Elec., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. For a more detailed discussion, see generally
Rodgers, supra note 47, at 752–59.
61. See generally United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1997); GFI, Inc. v. Franklin
Corp., 265 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
62. See Murata Mfg., 2007 WL 781252 *6.
63. DENNIS D. PRATER ET AL., EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD, 1013 (2d ed. 2002) (citing
United States v. Yerardi, 192 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that “[t]he concept of waiver by conduct
exists, but often amounts simply to a determination that the privilege holder’s conduct makes it unfair to
allow subsequent assertion of the privilege”).
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For example, if an attorney testifies that he had no knowledge of
prior art, he likely waives his client’s privilege to any documents
possibly revealing his knowledge of prior art at the time.64 The courts
generally find waiver in those situations because of fairness,65 and
because of the desire to strictly construe the attorney-client privilege
in favor of broad discovery.66 “A mere denial of intent, without more,
is insufficient to constitute a waiver.”67 What “more” is sufficient to
waive attorney-client privilege remains less clear.68 At this critical
juncture patentees encounter a brick wall; this “more” defines the
scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver in inequitable conduct
cases, and district courts inconsistently apply the waiver’s scope,
even in cases with similar facts.69 Once a court determines that a
patentee has waived attorney-client privilege, the patentee may
tremble with fear—and for good reason.
c. Defining the Scope of the Waiver When Attorney-Client
Privilege Is Waived
True difficulty arises when determining the scope of the waiver.
Once the court finds waiver of the attorney-client privilege, that
waiver extends to “all communications pertaining to the subject
64. Gen. Elec., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (holding that because a party claiming privilege
offered testimony regarding lack of intent, amounting to more than mere denial of intent, he therefore
waived privilege). But see Murata Mfg., 2007 WL 781252 at *5 (holding that “the mere fact that one’s
‘state of mind’ becomes an issue in a case does not necessarily mean that the attorney-client privilege
has been waived” but instead “the manner of proof involved . . . determines whether there has been a
waiver”).
65. See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (supporting
the proposition that “fairness dictates that a privilege holder ‘cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much
as he pleases, to withhold the remainder’”) (citation omitted); Ortland, 109 F.3d at 543 (holding that
when “a party raises a claim which in fairness requires disclosure of the protected communication, the
privilege may be implicitly waived”) (citation omitted); Gen. Elec., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679
(noting that when considering whether a client has waived privilege, the court looks to “considerations
of fairness and consistency”).
66. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618,
621 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
67. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also
Laser Indus. v. Reliant Techs., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
68. Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Inc., 234 F.R.D. 667, 670–73 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (providing an excellent
run-down on the law of attorney-client privilege waiver in inequitable conduct cases).
69. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c. (discussing the scope of the waiver).
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matter of the [already disclosed] communications,” and all courts
recite this rule.70 However, what exactly constitutes “subject matter”
can vary broadly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.71 The Federal
Circuit does not use a bright line test to determine what constitutes
the subject matter of the waiver of attorney-client privilege; rather,
the court “weigh[s] the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of
the legal advice sought, and the prejudice to the parties of permitting
or prohibiting further disclosures.”72 Uncertainty about the scope of
the waiver effectively handcuffs patentees with an unpredictable
waiver issue, which may cause a significant imbalance in trial.
C. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) Fact Witnesses: What’s in a Name?
Rather than volunteering the prosecuting patent attorney as a
witness in court when defending a charge of inequitable conduct, a
patentee may designate the attorney as a Rule 30(b)(6) fact witness
when opposing counsel seeks information relating to inequitable
conduct claims.73 This could theoretically occur without waiving
privilege. Under this rule, titled “Depositions Upon Oral
Examination,” a party may name an organization74 as a deponent and
request testimony on a limited subject matter “describe[d] with
reasonable particularity.”75 The organization so named must then
appoint someone76 to testify on matters “known or reasonably
available to the organization.”77 Testimony provided by a fact witness
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) as the patentee’s representative is
equally binding upon the patentee whether taking place in deposition

70. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Schofield v. United States
Steel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-520-PRC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30471 at *8 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
71. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.
72. Fort James Corp v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).
74. Here, an organization includes “a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or
governmental agency.” Id.
75. Id.
76. The organization “shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other
persons who consent to testify on its behalf.” Id.
77. Id.
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or trial.78 “The testimony of such persons so designated is the
testimony of the corporation.”79 “If the corporation is a party to the
litigation, this testimony may be used at trial by an adverse party for
any purpose.”80
In this instance, the party alleging inequitable conduct against the
patentee could notice the deposition of the patentee requesting
information on a particular topic—such as matters relating to the
prosecution of the patent at issue—and the patentee would be
required to designate a representative for deposition capable of
speaking on the organization’s behalf on this topic.81 The patentee
could then designate the prosecuting patent attorney to speak on the
patentee’s behalf at deposition and perhaps eventually at trial.82 A
mere designation as a 30(b)(6) witness does not waive privilege.83
Could this designation allow the prosecuting patent attorney to testify
about the underlying facts of the case without implicating any issues
covered by the attorney-client privilege? Some cases indicate general
support for this proposition.84
Generally speaking, when invoking attorney-client privilege during
a deposition in a Rule 30(b)(6) context, it is “frequently held to have
been waived or inapplicable.”85 Once again, fairness remains a key
consideration: “‘[W]here invasion of the privilege is required to
determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application
of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information,’ the
78. See John J. Barnhardt et al., Use of Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions in Intellectual Property Litigation,
74 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 683, 688 (1992).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).
82. See Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1995).
83. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
84. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (stating that “[t]he privilege
only protects disclosure of communications” and “does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by
those who communicated with the attorney”); Pioneer, 238 F.3d at 1376 (noting that “[t]he district court
also suggested that offering corporate counsel to testify as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on factual matters
might have waived the privilege and any work product protection. We do not agree.”); Motley, 71 F.3d
at 1552 (stating that mere designation of counsel as corporate representative for deposition under Rule
30(b)(6) does not waive attorney-client privilege).
85. Rodger L. Wilson & Steve C. Posner, Questions Beyond the Scope: Defending Against the Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) Sneak Attack, 26 COLO. LAW. 87, 88 (1997).
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privilege has been held to have been waived.”86 Whether this
designation provides a safer method for attorney testimony without
waiver remains untested.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver in Inequitable Conduct Cases
1. Choice of Law: Eenie, Meenie, Miney, Moe
Federal Circuit law governs whether attorney-client privilege is
implicated in an inequitable conduct case; however, once a court
determines that the attorney-client privilege attaches, regional law
governs whether that privilege has been waived.87 The regional courts
have misinterpreted the Federal Circuit’s holdings in multiple
instances and held that Federal Circuit law governs waiver in this
instance.88 This misunderstanding may stem from the Federal
Circuit’s lack of a “consistent conceptual framework” for choice of
procedural law questions.89 The Federal Circuit only applies its own
law to cases of attorney-client privilege implicating substantive issues
of patent law; whether substantive issues of patent law are implicated
depends largely upon the court’s level of abstraction and does not
always reference other cases in the same jurisprudence.90 “The court
should not create its own body of . . . law in one case and then defer
to regional circuit . . . law in another” for cases implicating attorneyclient privilege.91

86. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
87. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
88. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 382,
391–92 (W.D. Penn. 2005); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618, 623 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
89. See generally Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A
Framework for Addressing the Choice of Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1639, 1639 (2005).
90. Id. at 1668–69.
91. Id. at 1674.
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This misunderstanding has created interesting results in the
regional courts. For instance, in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v.
Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., a Western District of Pennsylvania
Court held that the question of waiver arising from reliance on
counsel’s advice as a reason for not disclosing prior art to the PTO
was addressed under Federal Circuit law rather than regional circuit
waiver law.92 Similarly, in Leland Stanford Junior University v.
Roche Medical Molecular Systems Inc., the Northern District of
California Court held that when waiver turned on a patent applicant’s
submission of the material to the PTO, Federal Circuit law, rather
than regional circuit law, would govern the waiver analysis.93 This
misinterpretation results in an interestingly circular application of the
law: if the district courts apply Federal Circuit law, but the Federal
Circuit applies regional circuit court law, whose law is really being
applied?
In Murata Manufacturing Co. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., a recent case from
the Northern District of Illinois, the court did not even discuss choice
of law; when listing applicable law for the case, the court cited cases
from the Federal Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Northern
District of California, forging a patchwork of law that a litigant could
never anticipate before trial.94 Similarly, in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI
Inc., the District of Delaware failed to discuss choice of law, but
loosely applied only District of Delaware law before appearing to
come up with the scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver out of
thin air.95 In Leland Stanford, after a lengthy discussion highlighting
the difficulty courts face in applying Federal Circuit precedent, a

92. Martin Marietta Materials, 227 F.R.D. at 391–92.
93. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618,
623 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
94. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2007).
95. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Del. 2006), aff’d by 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
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Northern District of California court determined that Federal Circuit
law applied to waiver of attorney-client privilege.96
Some cases indicate that it does not matter which law is applied
because the law of the regional circuits is so similar to the Federal
Circuit law that the “choice of law” issue is merely academic.97
Digging deeper into the issue, the “choice of law” question is not
merely academic because the scope of the subject matter of the
waiver varies between the circuits—sometimes even varying within
the circuit—and may weigh on whether an attorney should take the
stand.98 Because of this spectrum of interpretation for the scope of the
subject matter waived by a voluntary disclosure, many cases include
discussions about the appropriate choice of law.99 One commentator
even suggested that courts generally pay lip service to the standards
articulated in In re Spalding, but then interpret the scope of the
waiver in the same manner they had before In re Spalding.100
Unfortunately, the choice-of-procedural-law debate for the Federal
Circuit also surfaces in areas other than inequitable conduct.101 One
commentator has proposed establishing a new framework for
evaluating procedural law in the Federal Circuit.102 While a solution
for this issue may not come immediately, this peculiar ingredient in
the stew of attorney-client privilege waiver sets the stage for the
unpredictability in the application of that waiver.

96. See Leland Stanford, 237 F.R.D. at 623 (involving communications between an attorney and the
PTO).
97. See In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In any event, we
would reach the same result applying Federal Circuit law.”).
98. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.
99. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
100. Jonathan G. Musch, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Patent Prosecution Process in the
Post-Spalding World, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 197–200 (2003).
101. See generally McEldowney, supra note 89.
102. Id.
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2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. First Things First: When Should Attorney Testimony
Implicate Attorney-Client Privilege
If a prosecuting patent attorney were to testify at trial, opposing
counsel would attempt to elicit any type of information to show that
the attorney had the knowledge and intent required to establish
inequitable conduct.103 Opposing counsel would likely ask questions
about why the attorney failed to disclose the allegedly material
information when prosecuting the patent. Assuming the attorney does
not admit his ineptitude or intent to deceive the PTO, the testimony
often falls into two major scenarios.
Imagine a scenario where the prosecuting patent attorney (A) is
testifying under cross-examination by opposing counsel (O):
O: Why did you fail to disclose Document Y when prosecuting
Invention X?
A: Because I did not think Document Y was material to the
patentability of Invention X.
O: Why not?
A: Because [insert mental thoughts and impressions comparing
the two documents].

A similar scenario follows:
O: Why did you fail to disclose Document Y when prosecuting
Invention X?
A: I was never made aware of Document Y (so I had no duty to
disclose it).

Should this type of testimony implicate attorney-client privilege in
the first place? None of the information in the attorney’s testimony
103. See, e.g., Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 8, 2007).
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explicitly mentions any communications between the attorney and the
client. However, if a communication did exist between the client and
attorney—assuming arguendo that the communication occurred
between privileged persons, in confidence, and for the purpose of
providing legal assistance—then this type of testimony would
implicate attorney-client privilege.
This type of testimony by the attorney, disavowing any previous
knowledge of the information or providing the attorney’s subjective
reasoning for failing to disclose the information, presents two
problems. On its face, it appears very self-serving; this testimony,
while opening the door to privilege waiver, likely has limited utility
in the courtroom. Of greater concern to the court is the verifiability of
those statements, an inquiry concerning waiver.104
Further, from a public policy viewpoint, attorney-client privilege is
designed to encourage “full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”105
Extending the privilege to encompass this type of information—such
as an attorney’s mental impressions,106 thoughts, and feelings when
determining prior art materiality—does not further this policy on its
face.
This point is of critical importance. If a court finds that attorneyclient privilege is not even implicated, then it follows that the court
should not find waiver of that privilege. If the court cannot find
waiver of the privilege, then the court should not order the client to
produce privileged documents on the same “subject matter.” The
court thus never inquires into the scope of the waiver. That inquiry,
however, causes the unpredictable disclosure results in most cases.107

104. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.
105. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
106. When discussing the attorney’s mental impressions, questions of work-product immunity arise—
a sibling issue weaving its way into the discussion in many cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
Although work-product is similar to attorney-client privilege waiver, this Note does not address workproduct.
107. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.
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b. To Waive or Not to Waive: That Is the Question
When testifying to the substance of privileged communications, a
party waives attorney-client privilege.108 In GFI, Inc. v. Franklin
Corp. an attorney testified about his state of mind, knowledge of
prior art, and communication with the patentee, and on cross
examination, he discussed his conversations with the inventor
regarding the duty of disclosure in a previous trial.109 Similarly, in the
District of Delaware, a patent practitioner testified in deposition
about communications with inventors regarding the materiality of a
prior art reference in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., and the court found
waiver of attorney-client privilege to all communications between the
inventors and practitioner.110 In those cases, the court found express
attorney-client privilege waiver because the attorney actually testified
about the substance of privileged communications, constituting a
voluntary privilege waiver.111
Courts often look at fairness when determining whether a waiver
of attorney-client privilege has occurred.112 This fairness analysis can
lead to incongruous results, because fairness, like beauty, can be in
the eyes of the beholder. From the perspective of the party claiming
inequitable conduct, it would be unfair for the defending attorney to
offer unverifiable, self-serving testimony without pointing to
anything to substantiate the claims. From the perspective of the party
defending the claim of inequitable conduct, it would be unfair to
allow unchecked claims of inequitable conduct with costly and
invasive discovery while handcuffing the prosecuting patent attorney
with an uncertain waiver issue. Which perspective dominates?
The fairness inquiry weighs heavily in the courts’ analysis. A court
recently found that forcing a party to choose between defending itself
(and waiving privilege) and opting not to testify (to preserve
108. E.g., GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
109. Id.
110. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (D. Del. 2006) aff’d by 543 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
111. See Praxair, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
112. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.
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privilege) was an intolerable choice, analogous to proposing that one
constitutional right should be given up to assert another:
If accepted, a defendant charged with inequitable conduct would
find itself between Scylla and Charybdis: it would either have to
waive its attorney client privilege in order to defend itself or
concede liability in order to preserve the privilege, which would
become valueless. In a constitutional context, the Supreme Court
has said that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be forced to
choose between asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege at the
price of relinquishing his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court found it intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another. While the
“benefit” to be given up—the attorney-client privilege—is not a
constitutional right, it is one that lies at the heart of our adversary
system.113

In General Electric Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., a District of
Delaware case, counsel testified about his intent (or lack of intent) to
defraud the PTO.114 The court found defendants could refute such
testimony only by examining the communications because “[i]n light
of [plaintiff]’s affirmative representations regarding [the attorneys’]
state of mind, and in light of the record reflecting contemporaneous
communications between [the attorneys], fairness requires that
defendants be allowed to uncover the foundations for [plaintiff]’s
assertions.”115 In this case, the prosecuting patent attorney offered
testimony denying any recollection of the prior art at issue, and stated
that even if he had remembered it, he would have considered it
irrelevant.116 The court found partial privilege waiver because a party
testifying about its state of mind at the time of alleged privileged
113. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2007) (citations omitted).
114. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678–80 (D. Del. 1990).
115. Id. at 1679–80.
116. Id. at 1679.
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communications must allow the opposition to discover the privileged
communications or point to non-privileged communications
instead.117
Similarly, in Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Development
Corp., the Northern District of California found partial waiver of
attorney-client privilege when the prosecuting patent attorney
testified that he disclosed all material prior art he was aware of to the
PTO.118 There, the court found it would be unfair to deny opposing
counsel the opportunity to discover other relevant facts with respect
to the same subject matter, and found the attorney’s statements
amounted to more than a mere denial of intent.119 The Western
District of Pennsylvania also found waiver of attorney client
privilege because the plaintiff’s attorney testified about his
understanding of his duty to disclose, materiality of prior art, and the
role attorney-client communications played in the decision not to
disclose.120 In those three cases, the courts found waiver of attorneyclient privilege out of fairness to the party alleging inequitable
conduct, finding it unfair to allow the prosecuting patent attorney to
testify at length without allowing the opposing party to view the
information tending to support or refute his statements.
Compare those cases with Murata Manufacturing. Co. v. Bel Fuse,
Inc., where, after Murata claimed the prior art was “so immaterial to
the patentability of the patent-in-suit that the inventors and Murata’s
attorneys never even considered disclosing it” in depositions and
interrogatories, the court found no waiver occurred.121 In Murata, the
court
found
that
the
non-privileged,
publicly-available
communications between the PTO Examiner and Murata’s attorneys
provided sufficient evidence to opposing counsel to avoid waiver.122
117. Id. at 1679–80.
118. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 655–56 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
119. Id. at 653–54.
120. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 382, 397 (W.D.
Penn. 2005).
121. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8,
2007).
122. Id.
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With such extremely similar facts, why do those two cases have such
opposite results after applying the same standards of fairness? In
Murata, the attorney was testifying as a 30(b)(6) fact witness;
whether this designation resolves those seemingly incongruous
results remains unclear.123
Even absent designation as a 30(b)(6) witness, some courts still
find no waiver occurs from attorney testimony defending a charge of
inequitable conduct. For instance, in Laser Industries Ltd. v. Reliant
Technologies, Inc., a Northern District of California court found no
waiver when a prosecuting patent attorney made “a lengthy
declaration” about his knowledge of prior art and denied any fraud or
inequitable conduct.124 In the Southern District of Texas, in Derrick
Manufacturing Corp. v. Southwestern Wire Cloth, Inc., no waiver of
attorney-client privilege was found after an attorney denied recalling
any discussion of prior art with the patentee during the deposition.125
The common thread in Murata, Laser, and Derrick is the courts’
perspective on fairness; in each case, the courts focused on the
unfairness of forcing a party to choose between defending itself and
waiving privilege, or pulling its punches to avoid waiver.126
One argument supporting waiver in those cases involves a less
invasive discovery method, like disclosure subject to in camera
review;127 while less invasive, this is still extremely costly and
burdensome on the producing party. Some may even argue that no
true harm occurs unless the patent practitioner lied when testifying,
since documents ordered for production ought to be subject to review
in camera and disclosed only if contradictory.128 Courts may consider
whether a party alleging inequitable conduct seeks an in camera

123. See discussion infra Part II.B.
124. Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Tech., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
125. Derrick Mfg. Corp. v. Sw. Wire Cloth, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
126. See generally Murata, 2007 WL 781252 at *1; Derrick, 934 F. Supp. at 817; Laser, 167 F.R.D.
at 446.
127. An in camera review takes place either in the judge’s chambers or in the courtroom with “all
spectators excluded.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (8th ed. 2004).
128. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 n.4 (D.
Del. 1990).
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review or outright disclosure.129 The fairness to the parties, as well as
the burden and cost associated with the discovery, support a narrow
construction of attorney-client privilege waiver in inequitable
conduct cases.
Another fairness issue raised by courts involves improper use of
inequitable conduct allegations as a routine litigation tactic.130
Unfortunately, raising the specter of inequitable conduct in a patent
infringement suit is often nothing more than a litigation tactic aimed
to either gain broad discovery or force the adversary to pull its
punches.131 Patent infringement suits may be filed as “an excuse to
determine everything the opponent is pursuing as far as obtaining
patents”132 and “[a]ny willingness by a court to force production of
technical information will only further this improper and unethical
practice . . . .”133 For particularly abusive cases, Rule 11 sanctions—
allowing sanctions for parties who knowingly file papers or
misrepresentations with the court—are available but rarely used.134
“Alleged infringers do risk Rule 11 sanctions for a completely false
charge of inequitable conduct, but this hardly constitutes an
appropriate risk to balance the drawbacks to patent owners.”135 One
commentator suggests that providing for strict liability and costs to
the losing party, rather than relying on Rule 11 sanctions, would be a
more appropriate and fair process.136
Essentially, if an attorney testifies against a charge of inequitable
conduct, whether a court finds attorney-client privilege waiver
depends largely upon where the suit is brought and the particular
129. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Inc., 234 F.R.D. 667, 671 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
130. See discussion supra Part I.B.2
131. See Dolak, supra note 33, at 719 (“Its popularity as a litigation issue—some might say ‘tactic’—
should come as no surprise, given the advantages and potential dividends enjoyed by infringement
defendants who raise inequitable conduct challenges.”).
132. Rodgers, supra note 47, at 749; accord id. at 749 n.148 (“Plain logic dictates that a plaintiff is far
more likely to bring an infringement suit if it knows, win or lose, it has a good chance of discovering
valuable technical information from a competitor.”).
133. Id. at 749 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing sanctions for abusive discovery practices)).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Glenn E. Von Tersch, Note, Curing the Inequitable Conduct Plague
in Patent Litigation, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 422 (1998).
135. Von Tersch, supra note 134, at 426–27.
136. Id. at 440–41.
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biases and policy preferences of that court. Allowing this type of
inconsistent application of the attorney-client privilege waiver defeats
the purpose of the privilege, placing a patentee at an intolerably high
risk of loss if choosing to have an attorney testify at trial.
c. The Scope of the Waiver: The Devil Is in the Details
In general, once a court finds waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, the waiver extends to all communications between the
attorney and the client on the same subject matter.137 “The underlying
rationale is one of fairness: ‘A party cannot disclose only those facts
beneficial to its case and refuse to disclose, on the grounds of
privilege, related facts adverse to its position.’”138 Just as the waiver
of attorney-client privilege is inconsistently applied, the scope of that
waiver is also uncertain.
Some courts find the scope of the waiver very broad. For instance,
in one Federal Circuit case, an attorney testified, inter alia, about his
state of mind, knowledge of prior art, and communications with the
patentee.139 The court found a broad waiver of privilege, forcing the
production of otherwise privileged information;140 this information
included discussions of prior art before the PTO interview that were
questioned in the case. Although the court order was very broad, it
was in camera rather than outright disclosure; the information was
disclosed because it directly contradicted the testimony given by the
attorney.141 Similarly, a Northern District of California court ruled
that by submitting declarations to the PTO to support a petition to
correct inventorship in patent, and in those declarations the applicant
disclosed privileged communications with its prosecution patent
counsel, the patentee had waived attorney-client privilege and any

137. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
138. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1994); accord
FED. R. EVID. 502.
139. GFI, 265 F.3d at 1273.
140. Id.
141. See generally id.
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work-product immunity; that subject matter waiver extended to the
entire subject of inventorship.142
The Ninth Circuit construes subject matter more narrowly,
however,143 “holding that disclosure of information resulting in the
waiver of attorney-client privilege constitutes a waiver ‘only as to
communications about the matter actually disclosed.’”144 Even
further down the spectrum, the Second Circuit has held that
disclosing privileged communications does not waive the privilege
“beyond those matters actually revealed.”145 In each of those cases,
and in each circuit, the scope of the waiver follows similar fairness
trends as the waiver issue. Courts that frequently find waiver based
on fairness often construe the scope of that waiver broadly, whereas
courts that are more hesitant to find waiver construe the scope of the
waiver narrowly.146 Again, the ideological split breeds confusion and
the very type of unpredictability courts should seek to avoid.
B. 30(b)(6) Witnesses
Precious few cases explore the impact of attorney testimony as a
30(b)(6) witness in defense of inequitable conduct on attorney-client
privilege waiver. One recent case supports testimony on deposition as
a 30(b)(6) fact witness without privilege waiver.147 In this Northern
District of Illinois case, Murata sued Bel Fuse for infringement; Bel
Fuse asserted, among other things, inequitable conduct, alleging
Murata’s attorneys intentionally withheld one highly material
patent.148 In response to the inequitable conduct charge, Murata
designated a Murata patent attorney as a 30(b)(6) witness, and in
those depositions (and others), Murata claimed that the patent was
142. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618,
625 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
143. Id. at 622–23 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992)).
144. Id. (citing Chevron, 974 F.2d at 1162).
145. In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
146. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
147. Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2007).
148. Id. at *1.
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immaterial.149 In fact, Murata claimed it was “so immaterial to the
patentability of the patent-in-suit that the inventors and Murata’s
attorneys never even considered disclosing it.”150 Bel Fuse then
sought disclosure of documents related to this issue, to which Murata
claimed attorney-client privilege.151 Bel Fuse argued both express
waiver (for admitting the existence of privileged communications)
and implied waiver (for putting its state of mind as to key elements of
the inequitable conduct at issue) by designating the attorney as a fact
witness, but the court held no waiver and denied Bel Fuse’s motion to
compel.152 The court found no express waiver because Murata’s
witness admitted the existence of privileged communications, but did
not disclose the contents of such communications.153 The court found
no implied waiver.154 This is an interesting result in light of our
earlier hypothetical:
Bel Fuse: Why didn’t you disclose the patent X when
prosecuting the patent Y?
Murata: Because the patent X was so immaterial to the
patentability of the patent Y that we never even considered
disclosing it.
Bel Fuse: Why not?
Murata: Because of [“comparisons between the two devices, and
a history of prior art references made in prosecution of patents
for related types of devices”].155

This is almost directly opposite from the outcome in General
Electric where the court found the attorney-client privilege waived
when state of mind was at issue and the only way to refute the
attorney’s assertions was by examining otherwise protected
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1, 8.
Murata, 2007 WL 781252, at *1, 8.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *6.
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communications.156 Rather, in Murata, the court stated that “[i]t is the
manner of proof involved that determines whether there has been a
waiver”; the court found “nothing to suggest that resolution of this
issue will require examination of confidential communications.”157
If not looking to confidential materials, what materials can support
or refute those allegations? According to the Murata court, most of
those responses can be tested by referring to non-privileged
information in the “public record of the patent prosecution.”158 The
court highlighted the absurdity of a holding to the contrary:
Any defendant in any patent infringement case could destroy its
opponent’s attorney-client privilege by leveling the rather common
charge of inequitable conduct before the patent office. The plaintiff
denies the charge, thereby placing its state of mind at issue and voila,
the defendant has access to the plaintiff’s privileged communications
with its counsel. It would happen in every case.159
In 2001, the Federal Circuit discussed attorney-client privilege
waiver in conjunction with Rule 30(b)(6), but the case did not involve
inequitable conduct.160 In Pioneer, the Federal Circuit stated:
The district court also suggested that offering corporate counsel
to testify as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on factual matters might
have waived the privilege and any work product protection. We
do not agree. . . . Counsel is often a fact witness with respect to
various events, and may testify on deposition by the opposing
party as to such matters without waiver. A different result would
obtain, of course, if counsel were offered to testify as to
privileged or protected matters and might obtain if counsel were
offered as a fact witness at trial by his client.161

156. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679–80 (D. Del. 1990).
157. Murata, 2007 WL 781252 at * 6.
158. Id. at *7.
159. Id. at *8.
160. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
161. Id. (emphasis added). Compare id. (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th
Cir. 1995) (“stating that mere designation of counsel as corporate representative for deposition pursuant
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A different result may occur in those two situations because of the
way the privilege was used. In a 30(b)(6) scenario, the patentee uses
the privilege as a shield, preventing the opponent from probing into
privileged matters during discovery. When an attorney is voluntarily
called as a witness at trial, however, the attorney is using the
privilege as a sword to make assertions to benefit the patentee while
preventing the opponent from accessing information it may need to
refute the patentee’s assertions. This distinction, though untested,
may tilt the fairness analysis toward the patentee, and may provide
more favorable results.
III. PROPOSALS
A. Legislative Proposals—The New IDS Rules: Be Afraid. Be Very
Afraid.
The current major changes in patent law—from their
congressional, judicial, and PTO origins—should not be allowed to
ripple into other areas of patent law and cause significant imbalances
at trial.162 The proposed PTO rules are intended to increase efficiency
in the patent application process, not hamstring patent practitioners at
trial, but that may be exactly what those rules may do.
Those proposed rules would put patent practitioners between a
rock and a hard place. The attorney can limit the list to twenty items,
running the risk of a charge of inequitable conduct if a court deems
any of the items left off of the list to be an intentional, material
omission.163 Or, perhaps even worse, the attorney can prepare an
to [Rule] 30(b)(6) does not waive attorney-client privilege”)) with Leybold-Heraeus Tech., Inc. v.
Midwest Instrument Co., 118 F.R.D. 609, 609–10 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that “where patentee
named two of its attorneys as witnesses, patentee waived attorney-client privilege with regard to
documents which attorneys participated in, either as recipient of communication or communicator as to
prior art or as to good-faith belief and validity of patents in question and good faith in maintaining
lawsuits”).
162. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
163. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 (C.D. Cal.. 2007)
(stating a withheld document may lead to a finding of inequitable conduct if the court determines the
omission was intentional and material); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007).
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explanation of the relevance of any references in excess of twenty,
whereby those explanations enter the prosecution record and will
make for easy targets during litigation.164
If an attorney chooses the latter option and prepares explanations
of the relevance of documents in excess of twenty submitted in an
information disclosure statement, litigation over inequitable conduct
may center even more closely on the attorney’s discretion and
subjective opinions of materiality, and it may be even more important
for the attorney to actually get on the stand and testify, lest opposing
counsel paint a nasty picture of intentional deceit and concealment.165
Unleashing the litigation teams onto practitioners, while effectively
handcuffing practitioners with an unpredictable waiver issue, could
cause a significant imbalance in trial; timely resolution of this issue is
needed. The PTO should reconsider implementation of its proposed
rules because of these unanticipated collateral effects.166
B. Judicial Proposals: A New Standard to Even the Playing Field
Because of the unintended consequences rippling through patent
law from other areas, the Federal Circuit needs to take a new look at
the scope of the waiver of attorney-client privilege in the context of
inequitable conduct.167 The Federal Circuit has recently shown some
willingness to revisit attorney-client privilege waiver, but in the
context of asserting an “advice of counsel” defense.168 It should now
continue this trend by clearly articulating a narrow scope of the
subject matter waived by allowing an attorney to testify in defense of
a charge of inequitable conduct, and force courts to take those
documents into in camera review rather than allow immediate

164. See Nipper, supra note 17; see also Auth, supra note 16, at 1.
165. Litigators salivate at the prospect of litigating under those new rules, some even calling them a
“litigator’s dream.” Nipper, supra note 17 (“Joy! A litigator’s dream! Think of all the ‘inequitable
conduct’ and ‘fraud’ arguments that can be triggered by requiring the Applicant to comment on the prior
art.”).
166. See Auth, supra note 16, at 1; Nipper, supra note 17.
167. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
168. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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disclosure to the opposing counsel.169 This would maintain the
sanctity of the attorney-client privilege,170 would curb the abuses of
using inequitable conduct as a mere litigation tactic to uncover
research and development of patentees, and may stop the wildfire of
inequitable conduct before it gets out of hand.171 Thus, in the future,
when courts are faced with the illusive balancing test of fairness, the
slight presumption would tilt toward the patentee, allowing for more
consistent application of the fairness doctrine across the United
States.
C. Practical Considerations During Litigation: Recommendations
in the Meantime
Given the tremendous stakes of having the attorney testify—the
scope of this waiver could be very broad, invasive, and expensive—
and the lack of a bright line rule for determining the “subject matter”
of the waiver,172 having the attorney testify in defense of inequitable
conduct is extremely risky. Alternatives to minimize the risks
associated with attorney testimony include attempting to resolve the
scope of the waiver in advance, either by agreement with the other
party173 or by a motion to determine the scope of the waiver.174 Those
alternatives once failed to provide completely safe options—
sometimes the scope of the waiver was reopened during trial by an
opposing party, after the information in question had already been

169. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
170. See generally Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2007 WL 781252 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 8, 2007) (insinuating that the current rules destroy the heart and soul of attorney-client
privilege).
171. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
172. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“There is no bright
line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the
circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of
permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.”).
173. Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1994); FED. R.
EVID. 502(e).
174. See, e.g., Dey, L.P. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 567, 572 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Louis Vuitton
Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04-Civ.-5316-(RMB)-(MHD) 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87096, at
*16–17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2006).
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disclosed.175 However, under Rule 16(b)(5), courts have the
discretion to enter orders encompassing “any agreements the parties
reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection” after
production and now may be more inclined to address privilege
disputes early in litigation.176 This theme has been further codified in
Rule 502, which now binds parties to their pre-trial agreements on
waiver and limits waiver in one proceeding to only that
proceeding.177 Any movement toward more pretrial determinations of
the scope of the waiver, whether by stipulation or by court order,
would allow clients to enter into the privilege waiver arena with an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of such waiver,
and could restore the predictability missing in the current system.
Aside from stipulating ahead of time to the scope of the waiver,
perhaps the safest avenue for a patentee may be to try to designate the
patent prosecuting attorney as a 30(b)(6) fact witness. This may tip
the presumptions of fairness toward the patentee, allowing for a
narrower construction of attorney-client privilege waiver.178
Although the case law suggests this possibility may exist, this
relatively untested avenue remains risky, especially for the high
stakes in litigation.179
CONCLUSION
Attorney-client privilege waiver in the context of inequitable
conduct is currently quite chaotic.180 Many district courts are unsure
of which law to apply; even when the courts can get the right choice
of law for attorney-client privilege in inequitable conduct cases, the
scope of the waiver is construed so inconsistently as to become
nonsensical and abusive when viewed as a whole.181 Although it may
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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be possible to have an attorney testify as a 30(b)(6) fact witness, this
does not fully alleviate the problem.182 Now, with patent law in flux
and the new information disclosure statement rules looming on the
horizon, the perfect storm exists for litigation in inequitable conduct
cases to run amuck.183
The desperate need in this situation is for consistency. To get the
district courts on the same page, the Federal Circuit should articulate
a clear standard in favor of a narrow construction of attorney-client
privilege waiver in inequitable conduct cases.184 A narrow
construction would be in the interests of fairness, prevent abuses to
the system in litigation, and level the playing field given the new
information disclosure statement rules.185 Maybe then the patent
practitioners could get a good night’s sleep again.
Alexis N. Simpson

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
See discussion supra Part III.
Id.
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